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AMAZON.COM’S ORWELLIAN GAFFE:  
THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF SENDING E-BOOKS  
DOWN THE MEMORY HOLE 
Mariel L. Belanger∗ 
Then, with a movement which was as nearly as possible uncons-
cious, he crumpled up the original message and any notes that he 
himself had made, and dropped them into the memory hole to be 
devoured by the flames. 
   What happened in the unseen labyrinth to which the pneu-
matic tubes led, he did not know in detail, but he did know the 
general terms.  As soon as all the corrections which happened to 
be necessary in any particular number of the Times had been as-
sembled and collated, that number would be reprinted, the origi-
nal copy destroyed, and the corrected copy placed on the files in 
its stead.  This process of continuous alteration was applied not 
only to newspapers, but to books, periodicals, pamphlets, posters, 
leaflets, films, sound tracks, cartoons, photographs—to every kind 
of literature or documentation which might conceivably hold any 
political or ideological significance.  Day by day and almost 
minute by minute the past was brought up to date.
1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On Friday July 14, 2009, as users of the Kindle, the Amazon.com 
(Amazon) e-book reader, powered up their devices, something star-
tling happened.  Purchased copies of George Orwell’s 1984 and Ani-
mal Farm disappeared from Kindle e-book libraries.
2
  Amazon had 
discovered that MobileReference.com, the company selling the Or-
well books on the Kindle Store website, did not have rights to sell the 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna 
cum laude, 2006, The George Washington University.  Thank you to Professor Charles 
Sullivan for his supervision and unwavering guidance, and to Andrew Darcy for his 
helpful comments and assistance.  The author would also like to thank her family for 
supporting her through this and many other endeavors. 
 1 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 39–40 (1950). 
 2 Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Two Classics from Kindle (One is 1984), N.Y. TIMES, Ju-
ly 18, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 13725953. 
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works.
3
  Reacting as any conscientious, law-abiding corporation 
would, Amazon immediately removed the unlicensed content from 
the Kindle Store.
4
  Unfortunately, it also went a step further.  In the 
hopes of fending off any possible liability, Amazon reached into us-
ers’ Kindle devices and deleted the e-books directly from the Kindles 
of all who had purchased them.
5
 
Although Amazon e-mailed users after the deletion and re-
funded the purchase price, users and commentators alike were out-
raged.
6
  One privacy advocate described the incident as “the func-
tional equivalent of Barnes & Noble . . . using a crowbar or lock pick 
to break into your home or business, then stealing back a previous 
physical book purchase, replacing it with the equivalent value in 
cash.”
7
  Kindle users sounded off on discussion boards; one user ra-
ther vividly stated, “Amazon offered a product, which I legally pur-
chased, and had in my possession, until their electronic burglar stole 
it from me.”
8
  Amazon’s Chief Executive Officer, Jeff Bezos, apolo-
gized to users and called the company’s “solution” to the problem 
“stupid, thoughtless, and painfully out of line with [Amazon’s] prin-
ciples.”
9
  In early September 2009, Amazon reached out to affected 
 
 3 Bobbie Johnson, Why Did Big Brother Remove Paid-for Content from Amazon’s Kin-
dle?, THE GUARDIAN (July 22, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
technology/2009/jul/22/kindle-amazon-digital-rights. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Brad Stone, Amazon Faces a Fight Over Its E-Books, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2009, at 
B3, available at 2009 WLNR 14392434; see also Jon Garon, Amazon’s Next Kindle Class 
Action Suit, ENT. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP (July 20, 2009, 10:55 PM), 
http://lawbizbooks.com/blog4/2009/07/amazons_next_kindle_class_acti.html. 
 7 Thomas Claburn, Amazon Says It Will Stop Deleting Kindle Books, INFO. WEEK (July 
17, 2009), http://www.informationweek.com/news/personal_tech/drm/ 
showArticle.jhtml?articleID=218501227 (quoting e-mail from Lauren Weinstein, Pri-
vacy Advocate, to Interesting People mailing list). 
 8 r0b0d0c, Comment to Amazon Pulled a Book from My Kindle Library . . . What in 
the World?, KINDLEBOARDS (July 16, 2009, 8:20:28 PM), 
http://www.kindleboards.com/index.php/topic,11406.25.html. 
 9 Jeffrey P. Bezos, An Apology from Amazon, KINDLE DISCUSSION FORUM, 
AMAZON.COM (July 23, 2009, 12:16 PM), http://www.amazon.com/tag/kindle 
/forum/ref=cm_cd_ef_tft_tp?_encoding=UTF8&cdForum=Fx1D7SY3BVSESG&cdTh
read=Tx1FXQPSF67X1IU&displayType=tagsDetail. 
This is an apology for the way we previously handled illegally sold cop-
ies of 1984 and other novels on Kindle.  Our “solution” to the problem 
was stupid, thoughtless, and painfully out of line with our principles.  It 
is wholly self-inflicted, and we deserve the criticism we’ve received. We 
will use the scar tissue from this painful mistake to help make better 
decisions going forward, ones that match our mission.  With deep 
apology to our customers,  Jeff Bezos. 
Id. 
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users in an effort to right the wrong and stave off potential lawsuits
10
 
by offering them either a thirty-dollar gift certificate or a legal re-
placement of the deleted book.
11
 
While the apology may have been sincere and the replacement 
offer the best remedy for a poorly handled situation, the incident it-
self raises numerous legal issues related to purchasing digital content 
and the implications of this type of technology.  These issues have 
largely been ignored as technology companies, publishers, and au-
thors concentrate on copyright infringement, the “hacking” of e-book 
readers, ownership rights to literary works in the digital format, and 
determining the appropriate pricing and royalties scheme for e-
books.
12
  While all admittedly important questions, the sheer power 
that Amazon wielded in deleting user-purchased content deserves a 
more careful examination.  The fact that technology has developed 
to the point where consumer products constantly communicate with 
internet service providers, or are “tethered” as Professor Jonathan Zit-
train would describe it,
13
 should raise serious red flags as companies 
like Amazon use this connectivity to actually remove user-purchased 
content from devices.  Consumers deserve protections from, and no-
tice of, what is at risk when using modern technological devices like 
the Kindle—protection that our current law does not provide. 
This Comment should serve as a cautionary tale for zealous 
technology enthusiasts.  It uses the Kindle debacle to demonstrate 
both the inherent dangers in allowing technology companies to con-
trol consumer use of their products and the lack of recourse available 
 
 10 One lawsuit was filed prior to the September replacement offer and then sub-
sequently settled.  Complaint, Gawronski v. Amazon.com, No. 2:09-cv-01084-JCC 
(W.D. Wash. Jul. 31, 2009) [hereinafter Complaint]; Stipulated Settlement & Pro-
posed Order of Dismissal, Gawronski v. Amazon.com, No. 2:09-cv-01084-JCC (W.D. 
Wash. Jul. 31, 2009) [hereinafter Stipulated Settlement].  The claims alleged will be 
discussed in detail.  See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 11 Chad Berndston, Amazon’s Orwell Apology Can’t Quite Erase Kindle Black Mark, 
CHANNELWEB (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.crn.com/retail/219501636;jsessionid= 
N0JN342JHTJDNQE1GHOSKH4ATMY32JVN. 
 12 See, e.g., Martyn Daniels, eBook Pricing, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Apr. 5, 2009), 
http://bookseller-association.blogspot.com/2009/04/ebook-pricing.html; Matt 
Frisch, Digital Piracy Hits the E-Book Industry, CNN TECH (Jan. 1, 2010), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/01/01/ebook.piracy/; Patricia Resende, Hacker 
Breaks Kindle’s Proprietary E-Book Protection, CIO TODAY (Dec. 23, 2009), 
http://www.cio-today.com/news/Hacker-Break-Kindle-s-E-Book-Limits/story.xhtml? 
story_id=11300DWZ2N6I&full_skip=1; Motoko Rich, Plot Twist for Familiar Works: Who 
Owns the E-Book Rights?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 
25107841. 
 13 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 101 
(2008); see also infra Part V. 
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through our legal system to remedy any resulting harm.  The tech-
nology that enables remote access to user content raises the possibili-
ty that such technology may be used not only to remove, but also to 
surreptitiously edit content stored on users’ devices and effectively 
censor electronic publications in quite the fashion described by 
George Orwell in 1984.
14
  This is important because of the explosive 
growth of the Kindle and similar devices.  Most of America’s readers 
may soon be subject to such tampering.  To prevent this type of tech-
nological transgression from occurring in the future, legislative and 
regulatory action is necessary now. 
Part II of this Comment will explain exactly what the Kindle is, 
how the technology works, and what happened when the Orwell e-
books were deleted.  Part II will also discuss the one lawsuit that was 
filed in response.  Part III will assess the various claims that affected 
Kindle users could raise: whether Amazon has breached its Terms of 
Use Agreement; whether Amazon could be held liable in tort for 
 
 14 1984 depicts, in essence, a “negative utopia.”  See generally ORWELL, supra note 
1.  The story takes place in Oceania in the year 1984, and it follows the life of Wins-
ton Smith, a low-ranking government official in the Party.  Winston is disillusioned by 
the Party and its leader, “Big Brother,” which function as a totalitarian regime, con-
trolling every aspect of his daily life.  Wherever he turns he is confronted with images 
of Big Brother and the slogan “Big Brother is watching you.”  “Telescreens” are eve-
rywhere, even in Winton’s own home, so the Party can watch him at all times.  The 
Party implemented its own language called Newspeak, aimed at preventing political 
rebellion by eliminating all words related to it.  The “thought police” persecute, or 
more accurately vaporize, those who so much as have a rebellious thought, or com-
mit “thoughtcrime,” the worst crime in Oceania.  
The Party controls all sources of information, and it prohibits individuals from 
keeping any records of their past.  Winston himself works at the Ministry of Truth, 
where his job is to constantly update and alter historical records, newspapers, and all 
printed media to fit the current Party agenda and to portray Big Brother in the best 
light.  As a result, the citizens of Oceania are completely unaware of their pasts and 
believe what the perpetually revised histories tell them to believe—whatever the Party 
finds it useful for them to believe.  A telling Party slogan found throughout the novel 
is “Who controls the past, controls the future: who controls the present controls the 
past.”  Winston attempts to break free from Party control—he writes his rebellious 
thoughts in a diary, begins to piece together the lies that the Party has instructed him 
to “revise” printed history to reflect, and even falls in love (which is strictly prohi-
bited).  But in the end, he is caught by the thought police.  He is tortured and his 
spirit broken.  As a result, Winston becomes a Party drone with an eerie adoration for 
Big Brother.  
Throughout the novel, Orwell warns of the dangers of a government with abso-
lute power.  He stresses the role that technology can play in enabling oppressive gov-
ernments to monitor and control their citizens.  Finally, Orwell emphasizes the im-
portance of the past, of a tangible truth about what happened before, as it frames the 
way people look at the present.  1984 demonstrates that when technology is used to 
wipe out the past, it becomes an extremely powerful and dangerous tool, one that 
can oppress an entire nation without its knowledge.  See generally ORWELL, supra note 
1. 
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trespass to chattels or conversion; and whether Amazon could be 
held liable under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.  Part 
III will also evaluate what damages, if any, affected users could hope 
to collect if they successfully brought claims against Amazon.  Part IV 
will discuss the disconnect between the general public’s perception of 
owning digital media, the realities of licensing agreements, and 
whether, in light of this “Orwellian” incident, enough is being done 
to protect consumers’ interests.  Part IV will also consider whether 
regulatory intervention on the part of the Federal Trade Commission 
may provide protection to consumers.  Finally, Part V will address the 
future implications of this type of technology. 
II. THE KINDLE AND THE MYSTERIOUS E-BOOK DISAPPEARANCE 
Amazon is the global leader in e-commerce.
15
  A Fortune 500 
company, Amazon began as an online bookseller but has since ex-
panded into a variety of consumer goods provided to a variety of in-
ternational markets.
16
  In November of 2007, Amazon expanded its 
business even further by releasing its own consumer product—the 
first generation Kindle e-book reader.
17
  The Kindle is marketed as a 
“digital reading device.”
18
  In essence, it is a handheld, internet-
enabled device that is capable of downloading digital copies of books 
and displaying them on a black-and-white “paper-like” screen with the 
appearance and readability of printed-paper.
19
  For the avid reader 
and technology enthusiast, the benefits of the Kindle are numerous.  
Slimmer than the average magazine and lighter than a typical paper-
back, the Kindle is capable of storing 1,500 books at a time—a virtual, 
portable library.
20
  Moreover, in addition to hundreds of thousands of 
available books, the Kindle also offers subscriptions to newspapers, 
magazines, and blogs.
21
  Because the device utilizes Amazon’s Whis-
 
 15 About Amazon, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/Careers-
Homepage/b/ref=amb_link_5763692_1?ie=UTF8&node=239364011&pf_rd_m= 
ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_s=left-4&pf_rd_r=1H95X9QBZP09DH8T1AW8&pf_rd_t= 
101&pf_rd_p=465323111&pf_rd_i=239365011 (last visited Jan. 14, 2010). 
 16 Id.  
 17 Nilay Patel, Kindle Sells Out in 5.5 Hours, ENGADGET (Nov. 21, 2007), 
http://www.engadget.com/2007/11/21/kindle-sells-out-in-two-days. 
 18 Kindle Wireless Reading Device, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/Wireless-
Reading-Display-InternationalGeneration/dp/B0015T963C/ref=sa_menu_kdp2i3?pf 
_rd_p=328655101&pf_rd_s=left-nav-1&pf_rd_t=101&pf_rd_i=507846&pf_rd_m= 
ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_r=1AM92V4G6XZHYNHJBKMX (last visited Oct. 22 
2009) [hereinafter Kindle Wireless Reading Device]. 
 19 Id.  
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
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pernet cellular-network technology, users can access the virtual Kin-
dle store anywhere,
22
 and purchased content is automatically and 
wirelessly “delivered” to the device.
23
 
Amazon allows third-party companies to publish digital content 
for the Kindle and sell it directly to users through the Kindle Store.
24
  
MobileReference.com is one such third-party seller, and it offered 
both 1984 and Animal Farm for sale on the Kindle Store website.
25
  Ac-
cording to an Amazon spokesperson, the actual Orwell rights-holder 
contacted Amazon and informed it that MobileReference.com did 
not have the rights to sell the Orwell titles.
26
  Upon receiving this in-
formation from the rights-holder, Amazon removed the e-books from 
both the Kindle Store and customers’ devices, and refunded the pur-
chase price.
27
 
While Amazon responded to the situation swiftly, it did not in-
itially inform consumers why their e-books had been deleted.
28
  An-
noyed consumers were notified by e-mail that the purchase price of 
the books had been refunded, but no explanation was given.
29
  After 
numerous inquiries, Amazon responded to one consumer that, 
“[a]lthough a rarity, publishers can decide to pull their content from 
the Kindle store.”
30
  Amazon answered another Kindle user’s request 
 
 22 While the Kindle was initially only available in the United States, in October of 
2009, Amazon expanded the Kindle market to include numerous foreign countries.  
Joseph Galante, Amazon.com Unveils Overseas Version of Kindle Reader (Update3), 
BLOOMBERG.COM,(Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601103&sid=afYqQl7AQNY0; see also Kindle Wireless Reading Device, supra note 18. 
 23 Kindle Wireless Reading Device, supra note 18. 
 24 Welcome to the Digital Text Platform, AMAZON.COM, https://dtp.amazon.com/ 
mn/signin?ie=UTF8&ld=AZKindleMakeM (last visited Sept. 12, 2009). 
 25 Johnson, supra note 3. 
 26 Stone, supra note 2. 
 27 Id.  
 28 See Mysterious George Orwell Refunds, KINDLE DISCUSSION FORUM, AMAZON.COM, 
http://www.amazon.com/tag/kindle/forum/ref=cm_cd_pg_newest?%5Fencoding=
UTF8&cdForum=Fx1D7SY3BVSESG&cdPage=1&cdSort=oldest&cdThread=Tx1QUP
1NLUY4Q5M&displayType=tagsDetail (last visited Sept. 9, 2009).  
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at July 16, 2009, 12:49 PM (comment by Caffeine Queen).  The confused 
Kindle user posted the entire response Amazon gave her when she inquired as to 
why she had received a refund, which was as follows:  
The Kindle edition books Animal Farm by George Orwell.  Published 
by MobileReference (mobi) & Nineteen Eighty-Four (1984) by George 
Orwell.  Published by MobileReference (mobi) were removed from the 
Kindle store and are no longer available for purchase.  When this oc-
curred, your purchases were automatically refunded.  You can still lo-
cate the books in the Kindle store, but each has a status of not yet avail-
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to keep his copy of 1984 without any real explanation and stated, “un-
fortunately we won’t be able to offer any additional insight or action 
on these matters.”
31
  Finally, on July 17, 2009, Amazon e-mailed all af-
fected users explaining that the books had been deleted because Mo-
bileReference.com lacked the rights to sell them.
32
 
A media firestorm ensued.  Angry Kindle users and commenta-
tors voiced their discontent, seizing upon the ironic analogy between 
Amazon’s behavior and Orwell’s “Big Brother,” the Party leader who 
ordered the destruction of all literary material contrary to the Party 
message by sending it down the “memory hole” in 1984.
33
  Two such 
angry Kindle users responded by filing suit and requesting class certi-
fication to represent all affected Kindle users.
34
  Both plaintiffs were 
disturbed by the disappearance of 1984, but Justin Gawronski had a 
particularly compelling story. 
Mr. Gawronski, a high school student, was using the Kindle to 
complete a summer homework assignment in which he was required 
to read and reflect on 1984.
35
  He used the Kindle’s notation capabili-
ties to add notes to specific portions of the book as he read.
36
  One 
day in July, when Mr. Gawronski powered on his Kindle to continue 
his assignment, 1984 vanished before his eyes.
37
  While he was still 
able to access his notes, they were useless without the pages and spe-
 
able.  Although a rarity, publishers can decide to pull their content 
from the Kindle store. 
Id. 
 31 Complaint, supra note 10, at 7. 
 32 Id.  While MobileReference.com lacked the right to produce or sell Orwell’s 
works as e-books, a question may exist as to who does.  Surely Harcourt, Inc., which 
appears to own the original copyright, has claimed them.  See ORWELL, supra note 1.  
Sonia Brownell Orwell, however, apparently renewed the copyright in 1977.  Id.  As e-
books are increasing in popularity, legal battles are brewing between publishers, au-
thors, and authors’ estates as to who owns the electronic rights to older titles.  Rich, 
supra note 12.  Many authors have argued that their publishing contracts, signed long 
before the e-book innovation, do not speak to e-book rights, and therefore, the au-
thors themselves may sell the rights to their works in digital form.  Id.  Publishers, as 
would be expected, vehemently disagree even though most traditional publishers 
have only explicitly included e-book rights in contracts in the last fifteen years.  Id.  
 33 See, e.g., Claburn, supra note 7; Johnson, supra note 3; r0b0d0c, Comment to 
Amazon Pulled a Book from My Kindle library . . . What in the World?, KINDLEBOARDS (July 
16, 2009, 07:53:45 PM), http://www.kindleboards.com/index.php/ 
topic,11406.25.html. 
 34 Neetal Parekh, Kindle Lawsuit, Digital Rights Go Courtroom, TECHNOLOGIST, 
FINDLAW (Aug. 4, 2009, 8:44 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist 
/2009/08/kindle-lawsuit-digital-rights-go-courtroom.html; Complaint, supra note 10. 
 35 Complaint, supra note 10, at 5–6. 
 36 Id. at 6. 
 37 Id. at 5. 
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cific paragraphs in the book to which they referenced.
38
  Not only did 
Mr. Gawronski suffer the loss of the copy of 1984 he had purchased, 
but he also “lost” his homework assignment, which he alleged he had 
to recreate as a result.
39
 
The complaint that followed alleged numerous causes of ac-
tion.
40
  Among other things, the complaint sought a declaratory 
judgment that Amazon had violated its Terms of Use Agreement in 
deleting users’ books.
41
  The goal of the suit was clear: to force an 
admission that Amazon’s action in deleting users’ purchased content 
was outside the scope of its terms.
42
  Prior to responding to the com-
plaint, Amazon offered affected users the option to receive replace-
ment copies of the deleted books or thirty dollar gift certificates, 
which, in effect, admitted some level of wrongdoing while simulta-
neously eliminating any potential damages claim that Kindle users 
could allege.
43
  A few weeks later, Amazon was successful in settling 
the Gawronski suit.
44
 
The settlement itself is interesting.  The suit was settled for 
$150,000 for the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, a portion of which was to 
be donated to charity.
45
  The plaintiffs themselves did not recover a 
cent.
46
  Amazon did agree that it would not remotely delete pur-
chased content from devices in the United States, except in a few sti-
pulated circumstances: 
(a) the user consents to such deletion or modification; (b) the 
user requests a refund for the Work or otherwise fails to pay for 
the Work . . . ; (c) a judicial or regulatory order requires such de-
letion or modification; or (d) deletion or modification is reason-
 
 38 Id. at 6. 
 39 Id.  Because Mr. Gawronski’s harm was unusual, whether the plaintiffs would 
have succeeded in obtaining class certification in this suit is questionable.  To ad-
dress the issue, the complaint attempts to create three different classes: a class of all 
Kindle owners; a class of all Kindle owners who had an Orwell book deleted from 
their Kindle; and a third class of Kindle owners who, like Mr. Gawronski, had pur-
chased an Orwell book and had made notes, annotations, or highlights that were 
rendered useless by the deletion.  Id. at 8.  It is hard to imagine that a significant 
number of users fall into the same category as Mr. Gawronski.  
 40 See Complaint, supra note 10, at 10–15; see also infra Part III. 
 41 Complaint, supra note 10, at 10–11.  
 42 Id.  In addition to the declaratory judgment, the complaint sought restitution, 
damages, litigation expenses, and any injunctive relief necessary to protect the plain-
tiffs’ interests.  Id. 
 43 Berndston, supra note 11. 
 44 Stipulated Settlement, supra note 10. 
 45 Id. at 5.   
 46 Id.  
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ably necessary to protect the consumer or the operation of a De-
vice or network through which the Device communicates.
47
 
While perhaps a small victory for the plaintiffs, the settlement 
leaves the legal issues surrounding this technological capability un-
answered.  Moreover, although Amazon agreed to stop deleting us-
ers’ purchased content, based on the conditions set forth in the set-
tlement, Amazon still retains broad discretion in choosing when to 
delete content in the future.  Its technological capability to delete has 
not been disabled.  Moreover, many other popular technological de-
vices are also designed to allow their corporate creators to manipu-
late users’ content in much the same way,
48
 such as the BlackBerry, 
the iPhone, the iPod touch, the iPad, the Sidekick, the Tivo, and oth-
er popular “smart” devices.
49
  This same scenario surely could, and 
likely will, occur in other contexts.  As devices become “smarter” and 
many tangible things become digitized, it is increasingly important to 
understand what kind of recourse the law provides and consider what 
legal developments are necessary to provide adequate relief to 
harmed consumers and disincentives for companies to impermissibly 
access, edit, or delete consumers’ purchased content. 
III. THE RECOURSE AVAILABLE TO AFFECTED USERS 
Amazon’s actions appear questionable under a variety of legal 
theories; however, there are significant hurdles that may prevent the 
application of current law to intangible property.  Because the Ga-
wronski case settled, these issues were left unanswered and may re-
main unanswered until another technology mogul oversteps its 
bounds in an effort to control users’ smart device digital content. 
 
 47 Id. at 4.  
 48 See, e.g., Nick Wingfield, iPhone Software Sales Take Off: Apple’s Jobs, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 11, 2008, at B1 (“Apple raised hackles in computer-privacy and security circles 
when an independent engineer discovered code inside the iPhone that suggested 
iPhones routinely check an Apple Web site that could, in theory trigger the removal 
of the undesirable software from the devices.  Mr. Jobs confirmed such a capability 
exists . . . .”).  
 49 “Smart” is a term generally used to describe devices or products that operate 
with the use of computer programs and are enabled to access the internet and net-
work with other devices.  See Jean Braucher, When Your Refrigerator Orders Groceries On-
line and Your Car Dials 911 After an Accident: Do We Really Need New Law for the World of 
Smart Goods?, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 241 (2002).   
BELANGER_FORMATTED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2011  8:10 AM 
370 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:361 
A. Has Amazon Breached Its Terms of Use Agreement? 
The Gawronski suit raised contract and tort claims as well as 
state and federal statutory claims.
50
  The most obvious, perhaps, is 
that Amazon’s actions constituted a breach of its Terms of Use 
Agreement.  While a breach of contract claim appears to be a 
straightforward means of recovery, potential plaintiffs are unlikely to 
receive any meaningful compensation unless they commence a class 
action and obtain class certification.  This exemplifies the failings in 
our current law’s ability to protect consumers. 
Upon purchasing a Kindle, the buyer agrees to the “Amazon 
Kindle License Agreement and Terms of Use” and is bound upon 
first use of the product.
51
  With respect to digital content, the agree-
ment states that 
Upon your payment of the applicable fees set by Amazon, Ama-
zon grants you the non-exclusive right to keep a permanent copy of 
the applicable Digital Content and to view, use, and display such 
Digital Content an unlimited number of times, solely on the Device or 
as authorized by Amazon as part of the Service and solely for your 
personal, non-commercial use.  Digital Content will be deemed li-
censed to you by Amazon under this Agreement unless otherwise 
expressly provided by Amazon.
52
 
The plain language of this provision suggests that for valuable con-
sideration, in the amount paid for the content, Amazon “grants” us-
ers the right to keep a permanent copy of the content purchased.  
Therefore, by removing the permanent copies of 1984 and Animal 
Farm, Amazon arguably breached this express contractual term. 
The agreement does state that “Amazon reserves the right to 
modify, suspend, or discontinue the Service at any time” and will not 
be liable to users if it exercises that right.
53
  “Service,” however, is de-
fined as “the wireless connectivity, provision of digital content, software 
and support, and other services and support that Amazon provides 
Device users.”
54
  The definition includes only providing digital content; 
it does not include the power to alter or delete digital content.  So 
while Amazon reserved the right to discontinue the Kindle “Service” 
at any time, and has disclaimed liability for such an action, that does 
 
 50  See Complaint, supra note 10, at 10–15. 
 51 Kindle (U.S. Wireless) License Agreement and Terms of Use, AMAZON.COM, 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200144530& 
(last visited Aug. 28, 2010) [hereinafter Amazon Terms of Use Agreement]. 
 52 Id. (emphasis added).  
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. (emphasis added). 
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not suggest that it can take purchased content away from users in the 
process.  In fact, nowhere in the Terms of Use Agreement is Ama-
zon’s ability to alter or delete users’ purchased content mentioned.
55
 
Because Amazon potentially breached its contract, Amazon may 
rely on its Disclaimer of Warranties to avoid liability.
56
  The question 
thus becomes whether the disclaimer actually protects Amazon from 
what appears to be a blatant violation of its contractual terms.
57
  Ar-
ticle II of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), the model code 
that governs commercial transactions in goods,
58
 states that any affir-
mation of a fact or a promise that relates to the goods or any descrip-
tion of the goods made by the seller that becomes a “part of the basis 
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall con-
form” to the affirmation, promise, or description.
59
  In stating that it 
“grants” users the right to keep a “permanent copy,” Amazon likely 
has expressly warranted to provide permanent copies of digital con-
tent.  Section 2-316 of the U.C.C. states that “[w]ords or conduct re-
levant to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct 
tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever rea-
 
 55 Id.  
 56 The disclaimer of warranties states the following: 
You expressly acknowledge and agree that use of the service, device, 
digital content, and software is at your sole risk.  Except for the one-
year limited warranty, the service, device, digital content and software 
are provided “as is” with all faults and without warranty of any kind and 
Amazon and its suppliers and licensors disclaim all warranties, express 
or implied, including, but not limited to, the implied warranties of 
merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, accuracy, quiet en-
joyment and non-infringement of third-party rights.  No oral or written 
information or advice given by Amazon or an authorized representative 
of Amazon shall create a warranty.  The laws of certain jurisdictions do 
not allow the disclaimer of implied warranties. If these laws apply to 
you, some or all of the above disclaimers, exclusions or limitations may 
not apply to you, and you may have additional rights. 
Id. 
 57 See Amazon Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 51. 
 58 The Kindle, a “smart” device, is a hybrid product—a tangible good to which 
computer-like capabilities and internet service is attached. Braucher, supra note 49, 
at 241.  Professor Braucher has argued that Article II of the U.C.C. should govern the 
sale of smart devices because its provisions are sufficient to address “issues of contract 
formation, warranties, performance standards, and damages.”  Id. at 242.  The article 
does note, however, that the U.C.C. provisions are currently inadequate to address 
the specific issues of transferring intangible property and intangible property use re-
strictions.  Id.  While this approach certainly has not been adopted in every jurisdic-
tion (nor for that matter has the entirety of the U.C.C.), this Comment will use Ar-
ticle II to illustrate the possible outcome of a breach of contract claim in this case.  
 59 U.C.C. § 2-313(2)(a)–(b) (2005).  
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sonable as consistent with each other.”
60
  Applying that provision 
here, and construing the two terms as consistent with one another, 
would suggest that Amazon’s disclaimer of all express and implied 
warranties does not negate it’s express warranty to provide perma-
nent copies of the digital content.  Therefore, Amazon potentially 
breached its Terms of Use Agreement. 
If Amazon did breach its Terms of Use Agreement, the question 
that remains is what damage, if any, have Kindle users suffered.  As a 
result of Amazon’s actions, Kindle users lost the ability to use and 
read the e-book they had purchased.  Users could perhaps request 
specific performance, seeking to have the e-book returned to the 
Kindle, or some measure of compensatory damages.  Under the 
U.C.C., a buyer’s compensatory damages for breach with respect to 
delivered goods are “the difference at the time and place of accep-
tance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they 
would have had if they had been as warranted.”
61
  Here, because the 
book was in effect taken back without permission, that difference 
would amount to the price of the e-book itself, which ranged from 
ninety-nine cents to approximately ten dollars
62
—a miniscule amount, 
hardly worth the time, cost, and effort of seeking a judicial remedy.  
This exemplifies why class certification would be imperative in this 
type of case because an individual affected user stands to lose more 
than he or she could possibly gain by bringing suit alone.  A class-
action suit would spread the litigation costs amongst possible clai-
mants, mitigate the amount of effort each individual would need to 
expend, and likely command more effort on the part of the corpo-
rate defendant to reach a suitable remedy for all of its users.  Con-
versely, individual users hoping to vindicate their rights would perso-
nally bear the costs of litigation and, even if successful, recover next 
to nothing by way of compensatory damages. 
Moreover, while the cost of the lost book is the proper measure 
of damages here, Amazon refunded users the purchase price of the e-
books and offered users replacement books or thirty dollar gift certif-
icates, which amount to more than the cost of the lost e-book.
63
  
Therefore, Amazon has extra-judicially compensated affected users, 
which the Gawronski settlement noted as a reason the plaintiffs felt 
class certification would no longer be successful.
64
  In light of this, a 
 
 60 Id. § 2-316. 
 61 Id. § 2-714(2). 
 62 See Complaint, supra note 10, at 5–6. 
 63 Berndston, supra note 11. 
 64 Stipulated Settlement, supra note 10, at 3. 
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breach of contract claim, while perhaps theoretically possible, would 
not produce any meaningful result for plaintiffs. 
B. Could Amazon Be Liable for Trespass to Chattels? 
While a contract claim may not provide an adequate remedy, 
tort claims are better suited for this type of corporate transgression.  
Unlike a contract claim, plaintiffs who succeed on a tort-based claim 
may be able to recover compensatory and punitive damages.
65
  Faced 
with minimal compensatory damages, a punitive-damages award 
could serve both to compensate users and deter companies like Ama-
zon from meddling with user-purchased content.  The issues become 
whether a plaintiff could prove that Amazon’s actions warrant a puni-
tive-damages award, and whether the applicable law provides for such 
a remedy. 
Recently, the traditional tort of “trespass to chattels” has seen a 
revival in the cyberspace context.
66
  The Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
section 217,
67
 states that trespass to a chattel may be committed by 
“intentionally, (a) dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using 
or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another.”
68
  To 
intermeddle is to “intentionally bring[] about physical contact with 
the chattel,”
69
 that is both unauthorized and substantial.
70
  The requi-
site intent is to intermeddle purposefully, but 
[i]t is not necessary that the actor should know or have reason to 
know that the intermeddling is a violation of the possessory rights 
of another, and thus it is immaterial that the actor intermeddles 
with the chattel under a mistake of law or fact that has led him or 
 
 65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979). 
 66 See Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels, 17 
BERKLEY TECH. L.J., 421, 421 (2002). 
 67 While the Restatement (Second) of Torts is not law but rather a secondary authori-
ty, this Comment will use it to illustrate how tort claims could play out in the Kindle 
case. 
 68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965).  This discussion centers on 
trespass to chattels committed by using or intermeddling with the chattel of another 
because a dispossession of a chattel that results in the complete destruction of that 
property is considered conversion.  See infra note 100 and accompanying text.  The 
comments to the Restatement state that a dispossession that qualifies as a trespass to 
chattels is one in which the actor interferes with the possessory rights of the possessor 
and is liable for at least nominal damages.  § 222 cmt. a.  In contrast, a conversion oc-
curs when the actor exercises dominion and control over the chattel to a degree that 
so seriously interferes with the other’s possessory right that the actor may be required 
to pay for the full value of the chattel.  Id. 
 69 § 217 cmt. e. 
 70 See Quilter, supra note 66, at 425. 
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her to believe that one is the possessor of it or that the possessor 
has consented to the actor dealing with it.
71
 
Substantial uses that are sufficient to subject one to liability for in-
termeddling require impairment to the condition, quality, or value of 
the chattel.
72
  Moreover, the plaintiff need not own the chattel to 
bring a trespass to chattels claim; possession is sufficient.
73
  Finally, al-
though both privilege and consent are defenses, liability will still be 
imposed on an actor who exceeds the bounds of the privilege or con-
sent granted.
74
 
As cyberspace technology proliferates, the trespass to chattels 
claim has come to be used to combat internet “spam” e-mail.
75
  Hot-
mail Corporation v. Van$ Money Pie Inc. is a spam e-mail case that paral-
lels the Kindle situation in that the trespasser is claimed to have ex-
ceeded the limits of a terms of service agreement, which resulted in 
trespass.
76
  Hotmail alleged that the defendants, certain per-
sons/companies with Hotmail e-mail accounts, trespassed on Hot-
mail’s computer network and e-mail system, resulting in harm to its 
business reputation and goodwill.
77
  The defendants used Hotmail e-
mail accounts to send unauthorized spam messages, which violated 
the Hotmail Subscriber Service Agreement.
78
  The Service Agreement 
explicitly prohibited subscribers from using the e-mail service to send 
unsolicited spam.
79
  The court held that a claim for trespass to chat-
tels “lies where an intentional interference with the possession of per-
sonal property has proximately caused injury,” and it concluded that, 
in exceeding the Service Agreement and trespassing on Hotmail’s 
 
 71 § 217 cmt. c.  
 72 Id. § 218. 
 73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895(1) (1979) (“[O]ne who is otherwise 
liable to another for harm to or interference with land or a chattel is not relieved of 
the liability because a third person has a legally protected interest in the land or 
chattel superior to that of the other.”).  This is extremely relevant in the digital-
media context because users are often purchasing licenses, as opposed to full owner-
ship rights.  For example, while the Kindle users owned their Kindle devices, they 
purchased only non-exclusive licenses to possess and view a permanent copy of the 
Orwell books.  Amazon Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 51. 
 74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. c (1965). 
 75 See, e.g., Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., No. C 98-20064 JW, 1998 WL 
388389 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. 
Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 
1998); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal Rptr. 2d 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
 76 Hotmail Corp., 1998 WL 388389, at *2–7.   
 77 Id.  
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at *2.  
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computer system, the defendants had caused cognizable harm to 
Hotmail.
80
 
Analogous reasoning can be applied here.  By deleting the Or-
well books from users’ Kindles without authorization, Amazon ex-
ceeded its Terms of Use Agreement, which resulted in trespass to us-
ers’ devices.  The Terms of Use Agreement made no mention of 
Amazon’s ability to delete content, nor did it reserve Amazon’s right 
to do so.
81
  Kindle users suffered harm, the loss of the book each pur-
chaser desired, which arguably diminished the value of the Kindle it-
self.  The purpose of the Kindle is to enable users to purchase and 
view desired digital content.  By deleting users’ content without con-
sent, an action outside the scope of the Terms of Use Agreement, 
Amazon “intermeddled” with its users’ Kindles, which resulted in 
cognizable harm. 
Recovery for trespass to chattels in the form of intermeddling is 
generally limited to the cost of the actual harm suffered.
82
  Therefore, 
the usual measure for damages is not the market value of the chattel, 
but the amount by which the market value of the chattel has been 
diminished.
83
  Alternatively, some courts have allowed damages 
amounting to the cost of repair of the chattel, or both the diminished 
value and repair costs.
84
  This raises the interesting question of how to 
quantify the diminished value of the Kindle as a result of the e-book 
deletion. 
In the Kindle case, recovery for diminished value or repair 
would not likely amount to a more favorable recovery than breach of 
contract damages.
85
  If the court were to award repair costs, users 
could recover the cost of the book that they purchased, which would 
be equal to the cost of “repairing” the damage to their devices that 
resulted from the book’s deletion.  Similarly, the cognizable dimi-
 
 80 Id. at *7 (quoting Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1996)).  
 81 See Amazon Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 51.  Admittedly, this is not com-
pletely analogous to the Hotmail case.  Whereas here the Terms of Use Agreement 
failed to make mention of any power to reach into users’ devices, see id., in the Hot-
mail case, the Service Agreement expressly prohibited spam e-mail solicitation.  Ar-
guably, however, acting outside the scope of the agreed terms implicitly amounts to 
“exceeding” those terms. 
 82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e (1965). 
 83 DAN B. DOBBS, 1 DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 
5.13(1) at 836 (2d ed. 1993). This may also be referred to as the “before and after 
rule” because the plaintiff will recover the value of the chattel immediately before 
the harm, less the value of the chattel after the harm.  Id. at 836–37. 
 84 Id. at 838. 
 85 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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nished value of the Kindle is also the value of the e-book content that 
was lost, which would be measured by the purchase price of that con-
tent.  Therefore, under either measurement of damages, users could 
only hope to recover the minimal cost of the lost book—an amount 
that Amazon has already paid out to all affected users.
86
 
The only way affected users could recover more substantially is 
with a punitive damages award.  The Supreme Court has stated that 
punitive damages may be awarded in actions for trespass and all other 
torts based on the defendant’s degree of culpability.
87
  Courts have 
awarded punitive damages in spam cases where the spammer’s ac-
tions were deemed willful and wanton.
88
  In one such case, Tyco Inter-
national, Inc. v. Does, the court held the defendants liable for punitive 
damages, even though the plaintiffs failed to establish any compensa-
tory damage.
89
  While the spam attack on the computer system in Tyco 
was unsuccessful, and thus did not result in damage, the court found 
that the defendants acted “willfully, with fraud and malice” and were 
therefore liable for punitive damages.
90
  The court noted that puni-
tive damages were important to deter future computer hackers, par-
ticularly in light of the fact that no compensatory damages for a failed 
attack were awarded that could otherwise serve the deterrent func-
tion.
91
 
If the Tyco reasoning is successfully applied in the Kindle con-
text, affected users may actually have some hope for a substantial re-
covery.  As in the Tyco case, virtually no compensatory damages would 
be awarded because Amazon has already reimbursed users for more 
than the cost of the book.  A strong public policy argument could be 
made that punitive damages are necessary to deter this type of beha-
vior in the future, both from Amazon and other smart device manu-
facturers and service providers.  While deterrence is a lofty goal, 
whether Amazon may be liable for punitive damages would depend 
largely on the state of mind required for such an award in the juris-
diction in which a suit is brought.  State laws use a variety of “abstract 
and condemnatory terms” to describe the appropriate state of mind 
 
 86 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 87 Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 306 (1992).  
 88 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc., v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890, 
902 (N.D. Iowa 2001). 
 89 Tyco Int’l, Inc. v. Does, No. 01 Civ. 3865 (RCC) (DF), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
25136, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2003). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
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for punitive damages.
92
  Definitions range from malicious, as neces-
sary under the law of New York and applied in Tyco, to reckless, op-
pressive, evil, wicked, guilty of wanton or morally culpable conduct, 
or flagrant indifference to the safety of others.
93
  The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts states that punitive damages may be awarded “for 
conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or 
his reckless indifference to the rights of others.”
94
  It also stresses the 
deterrent function punitive damages are meant to serve.
95
 
In the Tyco case, the defendant acted with a wrongful or evil mo-
tive, intending to overload the plaintiff’s computer server and cause it 
to crash.
96
  In the Kindle episode, no one would contend that Amazon 
acted with wrongful motive, but Amazon did act intentionally, with 
the knowledge that its actions would deprive those Kindle users who 
had purchased an Orwell book of their purchased content.  Its ac-
tions can be characterized, as described by the Restatement, as both 
“outrageous” and indifferent to its users’ rights.  While recovery 
through punitive damages would be contingent upon applicable state 
law, a court embracing the Restatement definition, or a similar stan-
dard, could reasonably grant a sizeable punitive damages award be-
cause Amazon acted intentionally and knowingly in “intermeddling” 
with users’ Kindles.
97
 
 
 92 DOBBS, supra note 83 at §3.11(2), 468. 
 93 Id.  
 94 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979).  The restatement comments 
go on to state that 
[p]unitive damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, 
errors of judgment and the like, which constitute ordinary negligence. 
And they are not permitted merely for a breach of contract.  When, 
however, the plaintiff has a right in the alternative to sue for a breach 
of contract or for a tort, the fact that his act or omission amounts to a 
breach of contract does not preclude the award of punitive damages if 
the action is brought for the tort and the tort is one for which punitive 
damages are proper. 
Id. at cmt. b. 
 95 Id. § 908(1). 
 96 Tyco, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25136 at *11. 
 97 The Supreme Court has held that the ratio of punitive damages to compensa-
tory damages should not ordinarily exceed a “single-digit ratio,” but a higher ratio 
may be appropriate where “a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small 
amount of economic damages.”  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 
(1996).  As noted, any punitive-damage award would be contingent on the control-
ling law in the applicable jurisdiction.  See infra note 142 (noting that Washington law 
may preclude any punitive damages award against Amazon). 
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C. Could Amazon Be Held Liable for Conversion? 
Amazon’s actions could also be characterized as conversion, pro-
viding affected users with another possible tort-based claim.  Conver-
sion may arguably be a more appropriate tort claim than trespass to 
chattels because Amazon’s deletion resulted in a permanent dispos-
session of purchasers’ e-books.  The Restatement defines conversion as 
“an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel, which 
so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the 
actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the 
chattel.”
98
  The remedy for conversion is, in essence, a forced judicial 
sale of the chattel for its full value—when the defendant satisfies the 
judgment, title passes to him.
99
  If an intangible object such as an e-
book (as opposed to the Kindle itself) is a chattel, then the unautho-
rized deletion, or “dispossession,” of the e-book constitutes conver-
sion.
100
  Three basic elements must be met for a conversion claim: (1) 
a plaintiff has ownership or possession of the personal property, (2) a 
defendant has dispossessed the plaintiff of that property in a manner 
that is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s property rights, and (3) dam-
age results.
101
  A conversion occurs when “the actor has exercised such 
dominion and control over the chattel, and has so seriously inter-
fered with the other’s right to control it, that in justice he should be 
required to buy the chattel.”
102
 
Conversion can be committed in a variety of ways, including dis-
possessing another of a chattel or destroying or significantly altering 
a chattel.
103
  As with the trespass to chattels claim, the actor must act 
with the intent to exert control over the chattel; however, mistakenly 
believing that one has the privilege to exercise control does not re-
lieve the actor of liability.
104
  Moreover, a plaintiff need not own the 
chattel to bring a claim for conversion, and it is immaterial “that one 
 
 98 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (1965). 
 99 § 222A cmt. c. 
 100 See § 222A cmt. a.  
 101 § 222A. 
 102 Id.  The Restatement goes on to list what factors are considered in making this 
determination:  
(a) the extent or duration of the actor’s control, (b) that actors intent 
to assert a right inconsistent with the other, (c) the actor’s good faith, 
(d) the extent or duration of the interference with the other’s right to 
control, (e) the harm done to the chattel, (f) the inconvenience and 
expense caused to the other.  
§ 222A(2). 
 103 Id. § 223(a)–(b). 
 104 § 223 cmt. b. 
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in possession of the chattel is not entitled to retain possession against 
a third-party or has obtained possession wrongly.”
105
 Thus, it would 
not matter that the e-book sold was unlicensed.  
Conversion, as a descendent of trover,
106
 was traditionally limited 
to tangible property to provide remedies against the finders of lost 
goods who refused to return them.
107
  As notions of personal property 
evolved and tangible documents began to be used to represent in-
tangible rights, conversion was expanded to include the intangible 
rights represented by such documents, a concept called “merger.”
108
  
Under the merger doctrine, the intangible property represented in a 
tangible document is considered so completely merged with the doc-
ument that conversion of the document is treated as conversion of 
the intangible property.
109
  This concept applied to documents such 
as stock certificates, promissory notes, and savings bank bonds.
110
 
While the Restatement has not explicitly embrace extending conver-
sion to intangible property not represented by a tangible document, 
the comments do not rule out further expansion of the doctrine.
111
 
Today, courts applying the law of both California and New York 
have recognized the conversion of intangible property in the form of 
 
 105 Id. § 224A cmt. a–b.   
 106 Trover was an old common law tort designed to fill the gap left by actions in 
trespass, which involved the wrongful taking of property.  William Prosser, The Nature 
of Conversion, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 169 (1957).  Trover allowed a possessor to recov-
er lost goods (or their value) from a finder who did not return them but instead used 
them himself or disposed of them to someone else.  Id.  The plaintiff would allege 
that he possessed certain goods, which he lost, and that the defendant found those 
goods, and converted them to his own use.  Id.  
 107 Courtney W. Franks, Comment, Analyzing the Urge to Merge: Conversion of Intang-
ible Property and the Merger Doctrine in the Wake of Kremen v. Cohen, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 
489, 498 (2005).  
 108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242(1) (1965) (“Where there is conversion 
of a document in which intangible rights are merged, the damages include the value 
of such rights.”).  The Restatement goes even further to state that “[o]ne who effective-
ly prevents the exercise of intangible rights of the kind customarily merged in a doc-
ument is subject to a liability similar to that for conversion, even though the docu-
ment itself is not converted.” § 242(2).  Therefore, if a stockholder’s shares are 
“converted,” but he remains in possession of his stock certificate, the fact that the 
certificate only represents the intangible stock and does not constitute the actual 
“right” would not prevent him from substantiating a claim (even though the physical 
certificate has not been converted).  This concept could pave the way for a large-
scale expansion of the conversion claim to the digital intangible property context. 
 109 § 242 cmt. a. 
 110 § 242 cmt. b. 
 111 § 242 cmt. f (“The process of extension has not, however, necessarily termi-
nated; and nothing that is said in this section is intended to indicate that in a proper-
ty case liability for intentional interference with some other kind of intangible rights 
may not be found.”).  
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electronic data.
112
  In Kremen v. Cohen, the Ninth Circuit, applying Cal-
ifornia law, found a domain-name registrar liable for converting the 
plaintiff registrant’s domain name.
113
  In the early 1990s, domain 
names were available for free on a first-come, first-serve basis.
114
  The 
plaintiff, Mr. Kremen, seized upon this opportunity and registered 
“sex.com.”
115
  Meanwhile, alleged swindler, Stephen Cohen, while 
serving jail time for impersonating a bankruptcy lawyer, also saw the 
lucrative potential of “sex.com.”
116
  Upon being released from prison, 
Cohen wrote to the defendant domain-name registrar pretending to 
be an agent of the plaintiff’s company and stated that the company 
intended to abandon the domain name.
117
  The registrar accepted the 
letter and subsequently transferred the domain name from the Plain-
tiff to Cohen.
118
  Cohen then fled the country and turned the name 
into a lucrative porn empire.
119
 
While the facts of the case are both bizarre and amusing, the 
court’s analysis provides insight into the application of conversion to 
intangible property.  The court considered the situation analogous to 
a corporation giving away shares of stock after receiving a forged let-
ter, a circumstance that would most certainly constitute conversion 
under the merger doctrine.
120
  It stated that “it would be a curious ju-
risprudence that turned on the existence of a paper document rather 
than electronic one.  Torching a company’s file room would then be 
conversion, while hacking into its mainframe and deleting its data 
 
 112 See, e.g., Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003); Thyroff v. Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1272–73 (N.Y. 2007).  It is noteworthy, 
however, that many jurisdictions have yet to address this issue, and a few courts have 
refused to extend conversion to this context.  See, e.g., In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. 
Breach Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D. Mass. 2007) (applying Massachusetts law, the 
court held that the law would not recognize claims for conversion based on the ac-
quisition of intangible computer data); Famology.com Inc., v. Perot Sys. Corp. 158 F. 
Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (applying Pennsylvania law, the court found that a con-
version action could not be brought for the misappropriation of a domain name be-
cause it did not constitute tangible property). The fact that some jurisdictions have 
expressly refused to recognize a conversion of intangible property could preclude 
future plaintiffs who fall victim to corporations repossessing digital content from 
making a claim.  
 113 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1035. 
 114 Id. at 1026. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id.  
 117 Id.  
 118 Id.  
 119 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1027. 
 120 Id. at 1035. 
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would not.”
121
  Of particular significance, the court reasoned that 
while Mr. Cohen, the third-party forger, was the guilty party, it was 
not unreasonable to bring a claim for conversion against the domain-
name registrar even though it had not knowingly dispossessed the 
plaintiff of his domain name.
122
  This conclusion is paramount in the 
Kindle case because, while Amazon was not guilty of the underlying 
offense—intentionally selling unlicensed e-books—under this inter-
pretation, it could still be liable for conversion for taking those unli-
censed e-books from the users who purchased them.  Moreover, 
Amazon appears even more culpable then the defendant in Kremen v. 
Cohen because it did not accidentally deprive its users of their pur-
chased content but, rather, intentionally removed the content from 
their devices. 
Courts have also recognized claims for the conversion of elec-
tronic data and files stored on computers, which is perhaps most ana-
logous to the Kindle case.  In Thyroff v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Co., the Court of Appeals of New York, in response to a certified ques-
tion from the Second Circuit, held that a cause of action for conver-
sion applies to certain electronic computer records and data.
123
  The 
court stated, “We cannot conceive of any reason in law or logic why 
this process of virtual creation should be treated any differently from 
production by pen on paper or quill on parchment.  A document 
stored on a computer hard drive has the same value as a paper doc-
ument kept in a file cabinet.”
124
  In Thyroff, the plaintiff was hired as 
an insurance agent for Nationwide and, pursuant to an agreement, 
leased a computer system from Nationwide for use in his work.
125
  The 
plaintiff stored customer files in the system and used the computer 
for personal e-mail and other personal data storage.
126
  Each day, Na-
tionwide automatically backed-up all the information on the plain-
tiff’s computer system.
127
  Upon terminating the plaintiff’s employ-
ment, Nationwide blocked his access to the computer system, which 
left him unable to retrieve any of his personal data or customer in-
formation.
128
  After receiving the New York Court of Appeals’ answer 
 
 121 Id. at 1034.  
 122 Id. at 1035.  
 123 Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (Thyroff II), 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1272–73 
(N.Y. 2007). 
 124 Id. at 1278. 
 125 Id. at 1272. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id.  
 128 Id. at 1272.  
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to the certified question, the Second Circuit held that Nationwide’s 
action amounted to a conversion.
129
  It was not persuaded that Na-
tionwide owned all the records on the computer simply because it 
owned the computer system itself, and it noted that the lease agree-
ment did not contain any language to suggest that ownership rights 
would be transferred to Nationwide when personal property was 
saved to the system.
130
  The court posited, “Had Nationwide leased 
Thyroff a filing cabinet into which Thyroff placed his personal prop-
erty, such as a camera, Nationwide would not contend that it could 
seize Thyroff’s camera when it reclaimed its filing cabinet.  The in-
stant situation is no different.”
131
 
Applying the Thyroff reasoning to the Kindle case is telling be-
cause, much like Nationwide, Amazon backs-up Kindle users’ data, 
and the Kindle software is not “owned” by users.
132
  Kindle users, how-
ever, paid valuable consideration for the non-exclusive right to per-
manent copies of the Orwell books, which were stored on their Kin-
dles.  The Amazon Terms of Use Agreement, much like the lease 
agreement at issue in Thyroff, is devoid of language to suggest that by 
virtue of placing content on the Kindle, the content is owned by 
Amazon or that Amazon has a right to repossess or delete user con-
tent.
133
  Therefore, applying the logic of the Second Circuit, it appears 
that a claim for conversion could stand in this case.
134
 
 
 129 Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (Thyroff I), 460 F.3d 400, 404–05 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See Kindle Wireless Reading Device, supra note 18; see also Amazon Terms of Use 
Agreement, supra note 51. 
 133 See Amazon Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 51. 
 134 It appears that the conversion claim alleged in the Gawronski suit had a 
chance for success.  The Amazon Terms of Use Agreement states that Washington 
law applies to all disputes, and the suit was filed in the Western District of Washing-
ton.  See Complaint, supra note 10; Amazon Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 51.  In 
Compana, LLC v. Aetna, Inc., the Western District of Washington was presented with 
the alleged conversion of domain names.  No. C05-0277L, 2006 WL 829111, at *3 
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 27, 2006).  While the court found that the claim failed as a matter 
of law, it appeared to implicitly acknowledge that a properly pleaded claim for con-
version in this instance would be recognized under Washington law.  Id.  The claim 
failed because the defendant alleged that the plaintiff never had possession of the 
domain names at issue and because the plaintiff failed to provide evidence to show 
that the defendant “willfully interfered with any of its chattel.”  Id.  Therefore, it ap-
pears that the court readily considered the domain names “chattels” for the purposes 
of the conversion claim, and would be willing to entertain a conversion claim in a 
situation where the plaintiff can plead sufficient facts to show possession of the in-
tangible property at issue. 
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While conversion is plausible, as the claims already discussed 
have demonstrated, no hope exists for collecting additional compen-
satory damages.  One who has converted the chattel of another is lia-
ble for the full value of the chattel—the amount that Amazon has al-
ready paid to all affected users.
135
  The only hope for recovery again 
lies with punitive damages, which have been awarded for the conver-
sion of intangible property where willful and wanton conduct is exhi-
bited.
136
  In Northeast Iowa Ethanol, L.L.C. v. Global Syndicate Interna-
tional, Inc., the court, applying Iowa law, stated that “willful and 
wanton disregard” includes intentional acts in disregard of known or 
obvious risk, accompanied by an indifference to the consequences.
137
  
In deleting users’ purchased content, Amazon did act with disregard 
to the effect that such a deletion would have on consumers and ap-
peared indifferent to the consequences. 
Perhaps even more representative of the Kindle situation, how-
ever, is a case in which the court awarded punitive damages for the 
mistaken repossession of a vehicle.  In Adams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 
the court affirmed a jury award of punitive damages for the conver-
sion of an automobile and the personal effects within it.
138
  The de-
fendant argued that punitive damages were unwarranted because it 
had not acted maliciously.
139
  The court, however, rejected the argu-
ment on the grounds that punitive damages could be awarded if the 
conversion was committed in “known violation of one’s rights and in 
violation of the law.”
140
  It reasoned that, because the jury had found 
for the plaintiff on the conversion claim, the defendant’s actions were 
a violation of the law and the plaintiff’s rights, and warranted puni-
tive damages.
141
 
Applying that reasoning here, punitive damages may be reason-
able for a successful conversion claim.  If a court were to find that 
Amazon wrongfully converted the e-books, then it follows that its ac-
tions were a violation of the law and the affected users’ rights, and 
 
 135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (1965). 
 136 See, e.g., Northeast Iowa Ethanol, L.L.C., v. Global Syndicate Int’l, Inc., 247 F. 
App’x 849, 850–51 (8th Cir. 2007) (awarding damages for the conversion of $3.8 mil-
lion belonging to the plaintiff); United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1101 (D. 
Md. 1994) (awarding punitive damages for the conversion of stem cell research). 
 137 Northeast Iowa Ethanol, L.L.C., 247 F. App’x at 850–51 (quoting McClure v. Wal-
green Co., 613 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Iowa 2000)). 
 138 556 F.2d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 139 Id. at 739. 
 140 Id.  
 141 Id.  
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punitive damages could be awarded.
142
  Moreover, as discussed with 
respect to the trespass to chattels claim,
143
 a hefty punitive-damages 
award would serve to deter this type of Big Brother
144
 behavior in the 
future. 
D. Does Amazon’s Conduct Constitute a Violation of the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act? 
The plaintiffs in the Gawronski suit also alleged that Amazon’s 
actions were a violation of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (CFAA).  Enacted in 1984, the CFAA was designed to address 
computer crime, particularly fraud and the abuse of computer use 
and access, both physically and through the internet.
145
  Section 
1030(a)(5)(A) of the CFAA states that a person who “knowingly caus-
es the transmission of a program, information, code or command, 
and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without 
authorization, to a protected computer” or who “intentionally ac-
cesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of 
such conduct, causes damage” shall be punished pursuant to § 
1030(c), which provides both civil and criminal penalties.
146
  Whether 
Amazon’s e-book deletion constitutes a violation of the CFAA will 
largely turn on the interpretation of the statutory terms “computer,” 
“without authorization,” and “loss.” 
The threshold question for the claim is whether smart devices 
like the Kindle are “computers” within the scope of the statute.  A 
“computer” is defined as “an electronic, magnetic, optical, electro-
chemical, or other high speed data processing device performing log-
ical, arithmetic, or storage functions, . . . but such term does not in-
clude an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held 
 
 142 The punitive-damages analysis is, of course, contingent on the law of the appli-
cable jurisdiction.  In the Kindle case specifically, Amazon has included a forum-
selection clause in its Terms of Use Agreement, which requires all lawsuits to be filed 
in Washington state.  See Amazon Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 51.  Washington 
has a particularly stringent punitive-damages policy that prohibits punitive damages 
unless specifically authorized by statute.  Dailey v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 919 P.2d 
589, 590-91 (Wash. 1996).  Therefore, while punitive damages are reasonably argua-
ble under both tort claims, without statutory authority to grant them, none would be 
awarded in this case.  
 143 See discussion supra note 91. 
 144 See supra note 14 (discussing 1984).  
 145 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. II 2008).  
 146 § 1030(a)(5)(A), (c).  Section (g) goes on to state that a civil remedy is availa-
ble to “any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section.”  
§ 1030(g). 
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calculator, or other similar device.”
147
  A “protected computer” is such 
a device that “is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communi-
cation.”
148
 The Kindle is undeniably a “high-speed data processing de-
vice” that performs logical and storage functions and accesses data 
storage facilities and computer networks through its Whispernet 
technology.
149
  Moreover, the Kindle is used in interstate commerce 
and communication, as users are able to cross state borders and 
access Whispernet to purchase digital content from wherever they are 
presently located. 
What becomes more troublesome is whether Amazon, in delet-
ing the e-books, accessed the Kindle devices “without authorization.”  
The phrase “without authorization” is not explicitly defined in the 
statute, which has led to a split in the courts that have interpreted § 
1030(a)(5).
150
  With respect to Amazon, one interpretation would 
suggest its actions have violated the CFAA, while the other suggests it 
did not.  The split among the courts arose because, among the vari-
ous subsections of § 1030(a), the language used to describe the access 
element varies.
151
  While (a)(5) speaks of “without authorization,” 
(a)(4), which addresses computer fraud, uses the phrase “exceeds au-
thorized access.”
152
  “Exceeds authorized access” is defined in the sta-
tute as to “access a computer with authorization and to use such 
access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the access-
er is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”
153
 
Because “without authorization” is not defined, some courts 
have construed it as synonymous with “exceeds authorized access”
154
 
while others have emphasized the difference in the plain meaning of 
the chosen words in the two statutory sections.
155
  The semantics are 
particularly important here because Amazon did reserve the right to 
access Kindle devices to update software and deliver digital content.
156
  
Therefore, its actions appear in line with the definition of “exceeds 
authorized access.”  Consequently, if “exceeds authorized access” and 
 
 147 § 1030(e)(1).  
 148 § 1030(e)(2)(B). 
 149 See Kindle Wireless Reading Device, supra note 18.  “Whispernet” is the name of 
the software that enables the Kindle to wirelessly access the internet.  Id. 
 150 See discussion infra at note 157. 
 151 Compare § 1030(a)(5), with § 1030(a)(4). 
 152 § 1030(a)(5); § 1030(a)(4).  
 153 § 1030(e)(6). 
 154 See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 155 See US Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1192 (D. Kan. 2009). 
 156 See Amazon Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 51.  
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“without authorization” mean two different things, Amazon’s conduct 
may fall outside the scope of § 1030(a)(5) and the CFAA. 
In United States v. Morris, the Second Circuit defined “without au-
thorization” in the context of § 1030(a)(5) to include situations 
where an authorized user of one computer uses such authorization to 
access other computers and cause damage.
157
  The court concluded 
that, while the defendant had authority to access the internet from 
his computer, he was not authorized to transmit a damaging comput-
er worm to other computers and therefore acted “without authoriza-
tion.”
158
  Conversely, the court in US Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, con-
cluded that one acts “without authorization” only when the initial 
access is not permitted while one “exceeds authorized access” when 
the initial access to the computer is permitted but access to certain 
information is not.
159
 
Based on this apparent split of authority, Amazon would have a 
reasonably strong argument that, because it had initial authorization 
to access users’ Kindles, its actions in deleting the e-books were not 
“without authorization” and, therefore, fall outside the scope of § 
1030(a)(5) and the CFAA.  Nothing in the Terms of Use Agreement, 
however, “authorized” Amazon to delete user-purchased Kindle con-
tent.  Therefore, under the Morris interpretation, while Amazon had 
“access” to the Kindles, users could plausibly argue that Amazon did 
not have authorization to remove purchased content and its action in 
doing so was “without authorization.”  Whether Amazon’s actions fit 
within § 1030(a)(5) ultimately comes down to which one of these in-
terpretations a court chooses to adopt. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Amazon did act “without autho-
rization,” its actions likely do not amount to a “loss” necessary to sus-
tain a claim under the CFAA.  “Damage” is defined as “any impair-
ment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or 
information.”
160
  “Loss” is  “any reasonable cost to any victim, includ-
ing the cost of responding to an offense, . . . restoring the data, pro-
gram, system or information to its condition prior to the offense, and 
any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages in-
curred because of interruption of service.”
161
  The statute, however, 
limits the scope of the offense by making conduct that arises under § 
1030(a)(5)(A) punishable only if the damage results in a loss aggre-
 
 157 Morris, 928 F.2d at 509–11. 
 158 Id. 
 159 US Bioservices Corp., 595 F. Supp. 2d at 1192. 
 160 18 U.S.C. §1030(e)(8) (Supp. II 2008). 
 161 § 1030(e)(11). 
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gating at least $5,000 during any 1 year period to one or more indi-
viduals.
162
  Therefore, to make a claim under the CFAA, plaintiffs 
must be able to allege, in the aggregate, losses amounting to at least 
$5,000 from a single act.
163
 
The statutory language is none too clear as to what constitutes a 
“single act” and neither is the case law.  In Christian v. Sony, the plain-
tiffs alleged damage as a result of a defect in their individual comput-
ers.
164
  The court ultimately considered the defect in all affected com-
puters a “single act,” but it found that the aggregate damage suffered 
by the two named plaintiff’s did not meet the $5,000 threshold in the 
absence of a class certification, which the court had denied.
165
 Apply-
ing that reasoning here, the “single act” could be the collective dele-
tion of all Orwell books.  Much like the plaintiffs in Christian, howev-
er, meeting the $5,000 loss threshold would be impossible without 
class certification and perhaps still impossible even if a class were cer-
tified. 
As this analysis of the statutory language suggests, a court could 
deem a Kindle a computer, but users would nonetheless have a diffi-
cult time winning on a CFAA claim.  First, users would have to con-
vince the court that Amazon acted “without authorization,” not mere-
ly in excess of its authorization.  Second, the plaintiffs would have to 
plead sufficient facts to show an aggregate of $5,000 worth of losses, 
which would at the very least require a successful class certification.  
Thus, the CFFA may not be a viable option for consumers attempting 
to combat corporate manipulation of user-purchased digital content.  
IV. ARE CONSUMERS ADEQUATELY PROTECTED? 
The above discussion of plausible claims demonstrates that cur-
rent law poses many hurdles for consumers and likely little by way of 
remedies if successful suits are brought. Perhaps a better solution lies 
with administrative agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), which can monitor the actions of companies like Amazon, re-
spond to consumers’ complaints, and take action on their behalf.  
 
 162 § 1030(c)(4)(B)(i). 
 163 See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (concluding that the fact that the definition of “damage” is phrased in the sin-
gular demonstrates that the aggregated loss must stem from a single action or “im-
pairment,” and supporting this conclusion by quoting the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee Report, which states that losses caused by the same act may be aggregated to meet 
the threshold.). 
 164 152 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1186 (D. Minn. 2001).  
 165 Id. at 1187. 
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The more difficult challenge remains managing consumers’ expecta-
tions in purchasing digital content, which will require more than 
mere executive agency interference.  It will require a deliberate shift 
in business practices. 
As the media uproar surrounding the Kindle debacle raged, 
many infuriated users insisted that they “bought” the e-book and, 
therefore, believed that they “owned” it.
166
  The incident forced many 
to reconsider exactly what they had purchased.  Voicing frustration, 
some noted how different purchasing an e-book was from purchasing 
a physical copy.  One Kindle user stated: 
It illustrates how few rights you have when you buy an e-book 
from Amazon. . . . As a Kindle owner, I’m frustrated.  I can’t lend 
people books and I can’t sell books that I’ve already read, and 
now it turns out that I can’t even count on still having my books 
tomorrow.
167
 
Another simply stated, “I never imagined that Amazon actually had 
the right, the authority or even the ability to delete something that I 
had already purchased.”
168
  This raises the question: has Amazon mi-
sinformed consumers?  As the earlier discussion in this Comment in-
dicates, affected users who choose the courts as a method of recourse 
are unlikely to be successful in bringing about any meaningful 
change in the way that Amazon operates its e-book business—only 
the cost of the e-book is easily recoverable.
169
 
Moreover, Amazon reserves the right to amend or change its 
Terms of Use Agreement at any time.
170
  If actually found liable for 
breach of its terms as a result of deleting users’ e-books, nothing can 
stop Amazon from simply updating the agreement to provide itself 
with the power to delete content in the future.  Other e-book distri-
buters have similar terms in their service agreements,
171
 as do the 
 
 166 Johnson, supra note 3 (quoting the post of a puzzled Kindle owner from a Kin-
dle message board who stated that “[b]eing able to pull the books out of your paid-
for and legal library doesn’t sound right” because “[o]nce it’s sold, they no longer 
own the rights to that copy, or at least, that’s what I thought”). 
 167 Stone, supra note 2. 
 168 Id.  
 169 See supra Part III. 
 170 Amazon Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 51 (“Amazon reserves the right to 
amend any of the terms of this Agreement at its sole discretion by posting the revised 
terms on the Kindle Store or the Amazon.com website.  Your continued use of the 
Device and Software after the effective date of any such amendment shall be deemed 
your agreement to be bound by such amendment.”). 
 171 See, e.g., Sony Reader Terms of Service, SONY.COM, http://ebookstore.sony.com/ 
termsofservice.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2009) (“We reserve the right to modify, add 
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producers of other smart devices such as Apple, Inc.
172
  Merely by us-
ing the Kindle, consumers agree to be subjected to changing terms, 
which may detrimentally affect their rights to the content they store 
on their devices.
173
  The protection that a written contract provides 
consumers is seriously diminished when the dominant party to the 
contract remains able to unilaterally change it.  Perhaps Amazon and 
its counterparts should be forced to be more forthcoming with con-
sumers to ensure that they are aware of the vulnerabilities of pur-
chased digital content. 
Cindy Cohn, legal director of the Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion, noted that Legal analysts have 
long been concerned that digital rights management is essentially 
tricking people . . . .  It’s creating a situation where people think 
they’ve purchased something—in the way you might purchase a 
pair of shoes, for example.  But from the perspective of the seller, 
and often from the perspective of the law, it’s quite a lot less.
174
 
Many have suggested that the FTC should become involved and pro-
vide better regulations for digital rights management (DRM) 
equipped products.
175
  Others have argued that Amazon’s actions are 
a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibition of un-
fair and deceptive business practices.
176
  FTC involvement may pro-
vide users with something that a lawsuit cannot, a meaningful change 
in the business practices that have become commonplace in the digi-
tal content market. 
The Federal Trade Commission Act states that “[u]nfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby de-
clared unlawful.”
177
  In 1983, to better articulate the FTC’s enforce-
ment policy against deceptive practices, the Commission issued the 
FTC Policy Statement on Deception.
178
  The policy statement sets forth 
three elements of all successful deception claims: (1) the occurrence 
 
to, change or remove any part of these Terms of Service at any time, with or without 
notice.”). 
 172 See iTunes Store Terms of Service, APPLE.COM, http://www.apple.com/ 
legal/itunes/us/terms.html#SERVICE (last visited Jan. 14, 2010) (“Apple reserves 
the right, at any time and from time to time, to update, revise, supplement, and oth-
erwise modify this Agreement and to impose new or additional rules, policies, terms, 
or conditions on your use of the Service.”). 
 173 Amazon Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 51. 
 174 Johnson, supra note 3. 
 175 Claburn, supra note 7. 
 176 See Garon, supra note 6.  
 177 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
 178 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, appended to 103 
F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984). 
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of a representation, omission, or practice likely to mislead the con-
sumer; (2) the representation, omission, or practice is misleading 
from the perspective of a reasonable consumer in light of consumer 
expectations; and (3) the representation, omission, or practice is ma-
terial to the consumer’s conduct or decision with regard to a product 
or service.
179
 
Based on the process set forth by the policy statement, the FTC 
would not have a difficult time prosecuting Amazon in this situation.  
Amazon’s Terms of Use Agreement made no mention of its ability or 
willingness to delete content on consumers’ devices.
180
  In light of that 
omission, consumers likely believed that Amazon could not delete 
their purchased content.  Thus, the omission is misleading.  Reason-
able Kindle users assumed that the digital content on their Kindles 
was theirs to keep.  While the Terms of Use Agreement does state 
that digital content is licensed, not “owned,” by users, it refers to us-
ers’ licenses as the nonexclusive right to keep a “permanent copy.”
181
  
Even a reasonable user who takes the time to read the Terms of Use 
Agreement and understands that the digital content is licensed, 
would reasonably believe that the e-book purchased would remain 
permanently on the Kindle.  Finally, had consumers been aware of 
Amazon’s ability to delete their content, they may have chosen a dif-
ferent e-book reader or not bought a reader at all—they may have in-
stead purchased a traditional paperback or book on tape.
182
 
If the FTC is successful in bringing suit, it has the authority to 
mandate that Amazon change its business practices.  The Federal 
Trade Commission Act states that the FTC shall order an offending 
party to cease and desist from using a deceptive method or practice.
183
  
Therefore, the FTC has the power to order Amazon to stop deleting 
consumer content unless Amazon first discloses to consumers that it 
will do so.  But the Gawronski settlement demonstrates that this may 
not be enough.  In agreeing not to delete consumers’ purchased con-
tent in the future, Amazon qualified the statement by enumerating 
various instances in which it may still do so.
184
 The FTC may be able to 
mandate that Amazon lay out its deletion policy in its Terms of Use 
 
 179 Id. at 2–7. 
 180 See Amazon Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 51. 
 181 Id.  
 182 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 2 (“If this Kindle breaks, I won’t buy a new one, 
that’s for sure.”). 
 183 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006). 
 184 Stipulated Settlement, supra note 10; see also discussion in text at supra note 47 
(listing the various instances in which Amazon will still delete content from Kindles). 
BELANGER_FORMATTED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2011  8:10 AM 
2011] COMMENT 391 
Agreement, but that will not in and of itself remedy the unfortunate 
misconception that consumers have about purchasing digital content, 
nor will it make consumers any less vulnerable to future content dele-
tions. 
The Orwell debacle received significant press, and fear of public 
backlash may, for now, be enough to keep Amazon from overstep-
ping its bounds.  But Amazon still has the technical capability to 
reach in to Kindles and delete consumer content.  The only way to 
truly ensure that consumers are protected going forward would be to 
require that Amazon disable its deletion capability.  Prior case law 
suggests that the FTC may have the authority to require Amazon to 
do so.  As a condition of settlement with Sony BMG, in a lawsuit for 
placing hidden spyware software on consumer CDs, the FTC required 
Sony to disclose the limitations on consumers’ use of the CDs, prohi-
bited Sony from installing spyware software without consumer con-
sent in the future, and additionally required Sony to provide a rea-
sonable means for uninstalling the software on the CDs already 
sold.
185
  Further, the settlement required that Sony BMG allow con-
sumers to exchange the CDs and reimburse consumers for up to $150 
to repair damage to their computers suffered as a result of trying to 
remove the software.
186
  In light of this rather expansive settlement 
agreement with Sony, perhaps if the FTC chose to act, it could re-
quire Amazon to disable its intrusive technological capability. 
V. THE FUTURE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE “MEMORY HOLE” 
In response to the Amazon debacle, one insightful blogger 
noted, “Deleting copies of 1984 should serve to provide another re-
minder of the liberties we take for granted and the technologies that 
have the potential to put those liberties at risk.”
187
  The most disturb-
ing aspect of this incident is not that a major corporation may have 
breached its contract with consumers or was perhaps deceptive in de-
scribing its product; it is the sheer technological power that Amazon 
wielded in reaching into individual consumers’ devices and removing 
content of its choosing.  This power is a cause for concern as more 
and more aspects of daily life are controlled by computerized devices. 
 
 185 Brian Krebs, Sony Settles FTC Suit Over Music CD Spyware, SECURITY FIX, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 31, 2007 1:24 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ 
securityfix/2007/01/sony_settles_ftc_suit_over_mus.html.  
 186 Id. 
 187 Garon, supra note 6. 
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The Kindle is what Professor Jonathan Zittrain has dubbed a “te-
thered appliance.”
188
  Professor Zittrain refers to devices like e-book 
readers, smart phones, video game consoles, mp3 players, and digital 
video recorder (DVR) systems as “tethered” because the devices are 
constantly communicating with their corporate creators to assure that 
functionality and security improvements can be made as problems 
arise.
189
  Tethered devices are also built in such a way that only the 
manufacturer/service provider can modify them.
190
  Zittrain acknowl-
edges how attractive tethered devices are to some users because they 
tend to be more reliable and “safer” than computers running on op-
erating systems that third-party users can alter or tamper with to 
create computer glitches.
191
  He notes, however, that the shift to te-
thered appliances, centrally controlled by one powerful service pro-
vider, creates different dangers.
192
  Tethered devices can be easily re-
gulated and invite excessive intervention from both the service 
providers and government regulators.
193
  Amazon’s decision to delete 
unlicensed copies of e-books it inadvertently sold to customers is a 
perfect example of such power.
194
 
Zittrain argues that this shift to smarter, tethered appliances, 
changes the way that people experience technology because the de-
vice has become contingent on the service; even if paid for up front, 
the device is effectively now “rented” instead of “owned” because it is 
subject to impromptu revision.
195
  Economic theorists who believe 
that the markets tend to reflect demand do not see any real problem 
with this type of device and argue that it would not be lucrative for 
vendors to make changes that customers do not want.
196
  Amazon’s ac-
tions, however, prove that this theory is not infallible.  Moreover, as 
Zittrain aptly noted, companies may, in the future, be compelled to 
take action against the will of their consumers.
197
  With products te-
thered to a centrally controlled network, government agencies or 
courts seeking to regulate aspects of the internet need only require 
 
 188 ZITTRAIN, supra note 13, at 101. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. at 102. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 103. 
 194 Interestingly enough, in his book, Professor Zittrain actually predicted that 
something like this Orwellian disaster would occur in the e-book context.  See 
ZITTRAIN, supra note 13, at 109. 
 195 Id. at 107. 
 196 Id.  
 197 Id.  
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the service provider to take action, because the service provider has 
the ability to effect change in all the devices tethered to its network, 
without allowing for refusal from individual consumers.
198
 
Instances of court-ordered interference with consumers’ pur-
chased products have occurred through the use of tethered technol-
ogy.  In PlayMedia Systems, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., America Online 
was ordered to remove Playmedia software from consumers’ comput-
ers through a live update, after the court found that AOL did not 
have permission to include the Playmedia software in its offering.
199
  
In 2004, TiVo sued satellite television distributor EchoStar for in-
fringing TiVo’s patents by building DVR technology into some of its 
satellite dish systems.
200
  The jury found for TiVo, and awarded $90 
million in damages plus interest,
201
 but the court went even further.
202
  
The court ordered EchoStar to 
disable the DVR functionality (i.e., disable all storage to and play-
back from a hard disk drive of television data) in all but 192,708 
units of the Infringing Products that have been placed with an end us-
er or subscriber. The DVR functionality, (i.e., disable all storage to 
and playback from a hard disk drive of television data) shall not 
be enabled in any new placements of the Infringing Products.
203
 
The court essentially ordered EchoStar to remotely delete the DVR 
capabilities of numerous satellite dish systems already placed in cus-
tomers’ homes.  This is the judicially compelled equivalent to Ama-
zon remotely deleting books that it did not have the rights to sell.  In 
granting TiVo a permanent injunction, the court noted that “[t]he 
hardship of disabling DVR capabilities to Defendants’ DVR customers 
is a consequence of Defendants’ infringement . . . .  Defendants do 
not dispute that, with software updates transmitted directly to the in-
fringing products, the DVR capabilities of the infringing products can 
be disabled.”
204
  Therefore, through the use of tethered technology, 
 
 198 Id. 
 199 PlayMedia Sys., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 
2001). 
 200 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 13, at 103. 
 201 Id. 
 202 TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 2:04-CV-1-DF, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
64293, at *22 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2006). 
 203 Id. at *22–23 (emphasis added). 
 204 Tivo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670 (E.D. Tex. 
2006), rev’d in part, 516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  The injunction was stayed during 
appeal, and on appeal, in 2008, the court, reversing in part, found insufficient evi-
dence of infringement of hardware, but it affirmed infringement of software.  The 
stay on the injunction was lifted.  TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 516 F.3d 
1290, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  The legal battle, however, is still ongoing, because 
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courts have a method of perfect enforcement, never before available, 
to regulate digital media at the detriment of the unsuspecting con-
sumer. 
Even more troublesome in the e-book context are the First 
Amendment issues raised by the possibility that this technology can 
be used to remotely edit digital content, which effectively emulates 
Orwell’s Big Brother.
205
  The technology used to reach into devices 
and delete entire books clearly lends itself to altering specific por-
tions of that book.  Amazon’s Terms of Use Agreement expressly 
states that it will edit the Kindle software by periodically providing au-
tomatic updates and upgrades, as most similar smart devices do.
206
  
Surely purchased content could be updated and “edited” in much the 
same way.  If the power to remotely edit exists, courts could compel 
companies like Amazon—as a result of a libel suit, for example—to 
edit offending content.  While this has yet to happen, the future im-
plications of the technology are clear.  Professor Zittrain, in response 
to the Kindle incident, expressed concern about the ways in which 
this technology may be used across the world.
207
  He suggested that 
some governments may use it “‘like a line item veto for content’” to 
remove objectionable portions of books.
208
  “‘It could happen first in 
jurisdictions like the United Kingdom, where there isn’t as rich a First 
Amendment tradition and where libel suits happen much more fre-
quently.’”
209
 
The technological enforcement of libel-suit book bans is frigh-
tening because, unlike the book bans and recalls judicially compelled 
in the past, this new method is perfectly enforceable.
210
  No single 
corporate empire or government regulator should have the power to 
perfectly enforce such a ban, particularly when that enforcement 
could also be permanent.
211
  As Professor Zittrain noted, there are 
 
Echostar has been succeeded by Dish Network, and as of yet, no deletion has taken 
place.  Dish Network Corp. v. TiVo, Inc., No. 08-327-JFF, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
44722, at *1 (D. Del. May 28, 2009). 
 205 See supra note 14 for a discussion of 1984. 
 206 See Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 51.  
 207 Stone, supra note 6. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id.  
 210 See Farhad Manjoo, Why 2024 Will Be Like Nineteen Eighty-Four, SLATE (July 20, 
2009, 5:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2223214/. 
 211 For example, in 2007, the Cambridge University Press settled a libel claim filed 
in England by Khalid bin Mahfouz.  David Glenn, Cambridge U. Press Seeks to Destroy All 
Copies of Book on Terrorism to Settle Libel Lawsuit by Saudi Businessman, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., Aug. 1, 2007, at 12, available at http://www.campus-watch.org/ 
article/id/3779.  In the court hearing, the publisher promised to destroy all unsold 
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certainly some instances in which the ability to permanently remove 
information publically circulating on the internet would not be cause 
for alarm; for example, permanently deleting “leaked medical 
records, child abuse images, and nuclear weapon designs.”
212
  In the 
literary context, however, permanence is far too powerful.  Consider 
the numerous book bans that have been reversed in the past century.  
While courts have overturned or revised many decisions years later, 
this change of heart may not be feasible if offending works are sent 
down the digital “memory hole.”
213
  “Imagine a world in which all cop-
ies of once-censored books like Candide, The Call of the Wild, and 
Ulysses had been permanently destroyed at the time of the censoring 
and could not be studied or enjoyed after subsequent decision-
makers lifted the ban.”
214
  If technology is left to evolve in this man-
ner, without legislative and/or judicial interference, our future may 
come to resemble the Party-controlled society portrayed in 1984.  
Winston’s fears in the novel are telling of what such a future may 
hold: 
The diary would be reduced to ashes and himself to vapor. Only 
the Thought Police would read what he had written, before they 
wiped it out of existence and out of memory.  How could you 
make appeal to the future when not a trace of you, not even an 
anonymous word scribbled on a piece of paper, could physically 
survive?
215
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Kindle users were rightfully outraged by Amazon’s behavior, and 
Amazon admittedly has been extremely apologetic.  While future le-
gal action pertaining to the Orwell deletions is unlikely as a result of 
the settled Garwonski suit, the incident has certainly made tech-savvy 
consumers more wary of the technological capabilities of smart de-
 
copies of the book and contact university libraries across the world to ask them to 
remove the book from their shelves.  Id.  Libraries, however, were free to refuse to 
remove the book.  Manjoo, supra note 210.  Moreover, no inquest was made into the 
homes of those individuals who purchased the book to force its return.  See id.  Ama-
zon has demonstrated that had Mr. Mahfouz sued over an e-book publication, it 
could, in addition to stopping the sale of the e-book, reach into Kindles and take it 
back or perhaps redact the offending paragraph from purchased copies.  In a digital 
world in which hard copies are obsolete, this would in effect be perfect enforcement 
of the judgment because the court could arguably compel Amazon and other e-book 
sellers/service providers to eliminate all digital copies in existence.  
 212 See ZITTRAIN, supra note 13, at 116. 
 213 See id. 
 214 Id.  
 215 ORWELL, supra note 1, at 27.  
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vices.  Hopefully, as Amazon expands its Kindle market across the 
globe, it will be more mindful of consumer expectations. Nonethe-
less, much can be learned from what transpired. 
First, users of tethered devices may find little recourse through 
the courts when device manufacturers meddle with their content.  As 
the Kindle example illustrates, breach of contract claims may be diffi-
cult to successfully plead because of the increasingly complex agree-
ments into which users enter when purchasing such devices and the 
various disclaimers that manufacturers include.  Moreover, even if 
such suits are successful, compensatory damages in the breach of 
contract context would remain very limited.  While common law tort 
claims such as trespass to chattels and conversion allow for possible 
punitive damages, the first hurdle is determining whether varying ju-
risdictions will recognize intangible, digital content as a “chattel.”  Fi-
nally, the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, though reasonably 
applicable in this situation, requires an aggregate loss of $5,000, 
which forces individual plaintiffs who have suffered very little person-
al loss to garner successful class certification to bring a claim. 
Second, even if users could collect in court, without an injunc-
tion to bar a company like Amazon from exercising its ability to re-
move content for users’ devices in the future, a successful suit means 
very little.  Even in the Gawronski settlement, for example, Amazon 
agreed it would no longer delete users’ content, but it simultaneously 
reserved the right to do so in a myriad of situations.  FTC involve-
ment—specifically, instituting proceedings against Amazon for de-
ceptive business practices—may help to protect consumers.  This 
would be particularly true if the FTC could compel Amazon to disa-
ble the remote deletion technology and perhaps promulgate more 
specific rules for the ways in which smart-device vendors, such as 
Amazon, market products containing digital rights management 
technology. 
In the end, neither the courts nor the enforcement powers of 
the FTC can solve the overarching problem of regulating tethered 
devices.  Amazon’s actions demonstrate that current law has not kept 
pace with technology.  To stave off this type of behavior in the future 
and to ensure personal rights and liberties are protected, legal 
reform is necessary.  Federal law must better reflect the reality of be-
ing a consumer in this digital age while still balancing the important 
concerns of copyright, patent, and trademark holders.  The fear of 
future censorship, through the deletion and undetected editing of 
digital content, is real—the technology to effectuate such results ex-
ists.  The new generation of smart devices needs to be closely moni-
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tored and regulated to combat the possible infringement of First 
Amendment rights in the future.  We should thank Amazon and Or-
well for reminding us all to be cautious in embracing the technologi-
cal advances of tomorrow. 
If the Party could thrust its hand into the past and say of this or 
that event, it never happened—that, surely, was more terrifying than 
mere torture and death.
216
 
 
 
 216 Id. at 34. 
